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We examine the dynamic role of education and experience as determinants of wages. It is hypothesised that an employee’s education is an important signal to the employer initially. Over time, the returns to schooling should decrease with labour market experience and increase with initially unobserved ability, since the employer gradually obtains better information on the productivity of an employee. Replicating US studies using data from a large German panel data set (GSOEP), we find no evidence for the employer learning hypothesis for Germany. Differentiating blue-collar and white-collar workers and estimating quantile regressions, however, leads to the conclusion that employer learning takes place for blue-collar workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. We further show, that information on the productivity of an employee is to a large extend private.

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We develop a simple search equilibrium model of workplace training and education based on two features. First, investment in education improves job-related learning skills and reduces training costs burdened by firms. Second, firms with vacant skilled job slots can choose between recruitment from the market and training. Compared to Germany and Japan, the US [United States] has both a higher inflow rate into unemployment and a higher efficiency of the matching process. While the combined effort of these differences on the share of educated labour is ambiguous, the effect on the percentage of firms undertaking workplace training is to unambiguously reduce it.

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Several firm-related aspects of employee productivity are analysed using GSOEP [German Socio-Economic Panel] data. The basic premise is that, as a consequence of frustration, overeducated employees are less productive than their correctly allocated colleagues. However, the results obtained in the present study contradict the few available empirical findings, all of which are based on data from the United States. When comparing employees working in jobs with similar levels of requirements (the sole approach which seems to be useful), overqualified employees are found to be healthier, more strongly work- and career-minded, more likely to participate in on-the-job training, and to have longer periods of tenure with the same firm than their correctly allocated colleagues. No significant differences could be determined with respect to job satisfaction. These findings are consistent with the established fact that overeducated workers receive wage premiums for their surplus schooling. The overall results make the hiring of overqualified applicants understandable, and could explain the employers’ motivation to accept persistent overeducation in the labour force.

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This paper analyses the impact of formal training on worker mobility. Using data from the Swiss Labour Force Survey, we find that on-the-job search activities and, to a smaller extent, actual job separations are significantly affected by both employer-provided and general training. Moreover, while the separation probability of searching workers is strongly affected by previous firm-provided training, no such effect shows up for non-searchers. This is consistent with the hypothesis that workers bear most of the cost of specific training.

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This paper tests the hypothesis that unions, through imposing wage floors that lead to wage compression, increase on-the-job training. Our analysis focuses on Germany which provides an interesting context to test this hypothesis, due to its large scale apprenticeship programme and its collective bargaining system that is based on voluntary union recognition. To guide the empirical analysis, we first develop a model of firm-financed training. A novel feature of our model is that a unionised and non-unionised sector coexist, and only unionised firms are bound by union wages. The model creates a rich set of empirical implications regarding apprenticeship training, layoffs, wage cuts, and wage compression in unionised and non-unionised firms. Our empirical analysis is based on firm panel data matched with administrative employee data, and provides strong support for our model. Our main results are that unionisation increases training, and that wage floors and wage compression play a more important role in unionised than in non-unionised firms.

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This paper investigates the relationship between education and training provided by the firm, both on the job and off the job, using a unique dataset based on a survey of Thai employees conducted in the summer of 2001. We find a significant and negative relationship between educational attainment and on the job training and no significant relationship between education and off the job training. We also find that education and training are technical complements, especially in the case of off the job training. These findings are consistent with more educated individuals having higher marginal costs of training than less educated workers, especially when on the job training is concerned. Either the better educated have lower learning skills in jobs requiring on the job training or they have higher opportunity costs of training, or both.

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This paper develops a two-period labor market model with imperfect information and on-the-job training, and uses data from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohorts (NLSY79) to test its predictions. We find that training does not explain the positive relationship between employer size and wage. In addition, for industries that display size-wage premium, workers in large establishments are more likely to receive on-the-job training but their return to training is smaller. Our theory, substantiated by the new empirical evidence, suggests that it is not large firms, per se, but firms that hire better workers who are paying a wage premium.

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We develop a dynamic discrete choice model of training choice, employment and wage growth, allowing for job mobility, in a world where wages depend on firm-worker matches, as well as experience, and tenure and jobs take time to locate. We estimate this model on a large administrative panel data set which traces labour market transitions, mobility across firms and wages from the end of statutory schooling. We use the model to evaluate the life-cycle return to apprenticeship training and find that on average the costs outweigh the benefits; however for those who choose to train the returns are positive. We then use our model to consider the long-term lifecycle effects of two reforms: One is the introduction of an Earned Income Tax Credit in Germany, and the other is a reform to Unemployment Insurance. In both reforms we find very significant impacts of the policy on training choices and on the value of realised matches, demonstrating the importance of considering such longer term implications.

A later version of this paper is indexed at TD/TNC 99.632.

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This paper investigates whether on-the-job training has an effect on the employability of workers. Using data from the Netherlands we disentangle the true effect of training incidence from the spurious one determined by unobserved individual heterogeneity. We also take into account that there might be feedback from shocks in the employment status to future propensity of receiving firm-provided training. We find that firm-provided training significantly increases future employment prospects. This finding is robust to a number of robustness checks. It also holds for older workers, suggesting that firm-provided training may be an important instrument to retain older workers at work.

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Recent human capital theories predict that labor market frictions and product market competition influence firm-sponsored training. Using matched worker-firm data from Dutch manufacturing, our paper empirically assesses the validity of these predictions. We find that a decrease in labor market frictions significantly reduces firms' training expenditures. Instead, product market competition does not have an effect on firm-sponsored training. We conclude that increasing competition through international integration and globalization does not pose a threat to investments in on-the-job training. An increase in labor market flexibility may reduce incentives of firms to invest in training, but the magnitude of this effect is small.

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