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The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effects of job training programs, as part of the special training contracts (contrats speciaux de formation) prompted by the Moroccan government, on the performances of Moroccan firms. Using firm-level panel data, we highlight that the special training contracts are an efficient measure of public policy. Indeed, job training programs increase the competitiveness and the performances of Moroccan firms. Besides, these effects are even better when the implementation of training by Moroccan firms is part of a real strategy of human resources development. On the contrary, when firms consider the public policy only as a financing opportunity, they are severely sanctioned.

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The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effects of job training programs, as part of the special training contracts prompted by the Moroccan government, on the performances of Moroccan firms. Using firm-level panel data, we highlight that special training contracts are an efficient measure of public policy. Indeed, job training programs increase the competitiveness and the performances of Moroccan firms. Besides, these effects are even better when the implementation of training by Moroccan firms is part of a real strategy of human resources development. On the contrary, when firms consider the public policy only as a financing opportunity, they are severely sanctioned.

Published abstract. Show less