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This paper analyzes the factors underlying the evolution of the worldwide distribution of skills and their implications for global inequality. We develop and parameterize a two-sector, two-class, world economy model that endogenizes education and mobility decisions, population growth, and income disparities across and within countries. First, our static experiments reveal that the geography of skills matters for global inequality. Low access to education and sectoral misallocation of skills substantially impact income in poor countries. Second, we produce unified projections of population and income for the 21st century. Assuming the continuation of recent education and migration policies, we predict stable disparities in the world distribution of skills, slow-growing urbanization in developing countries and a rebound in income inequality. These prospects are sensitive to future education costs and to internal mobility frictions, which suggests that policies targeting access to all levels of education and sustainable urban development are vital to reduce demographic pressures and global inequality in the long term.

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We evaluate the effect of education policies, welfare programmes, technology and demographics on the differential evolution of the skill premium and on the rise in education investment in France and the US. We use a computable general equilibrium model with overlapping generations of individuals and endogenous education decisions. Human capital has two substitutable components - experience and education - both of which evolve endogenously over time. We use an original method to calibrate our model properly on the post-war period and run counterfactual experiments to assess the relative contributions of the different exogenous variables. The expansionary French education policy boosted the supply of skills and kept the skill premium low. In contrast, increasing education costs in the US contributed to increased wage differentials by reducing the rise in educational attainment. Skill-biased technical change is key to understanding rising school attendance and skill premiums in the US. It has a less important role and appears to be delayed in France.

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One of the most salient features of developing economies is the existence of a large informal sector. This paper uses quantitative theory to study the dynamic implications of informality on wage inequality, human capital accumulation, child labor and long-run growth. [The authors'] model can generate transitory informality equilibria or informality-induced poverty traps. Its calibration reveals that the case for the poverty-trap hypothesis is strong: although informality serves to protect low-skilled workers from extreme poverty in the short-run, it prevents income convergence between developed and developing nations in the long run. Sudden elimination of informality would induce severe welfare losses for several generations on the transition path. Hence, [the authors] examine the effectiveness of different development policies to exit the poverty trap. [The authors'] numerical experiments show that using means-tested education subsidies is the most cost-effective single policy option. However, for longer time horizons, or as the economy gets closer to the poverty trap threshold, combining means-tested education and wage subsidies is even more effective.

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Existing empirical literature provides converging evidence that selective emigration enhances human capital accumulation in the world's poorest countries. However, the within-country distribution of such brain gain effects has received limited attention. Focusing on Senegal, we provide evidence that the brain gain mechanism primarily benefits the wealthiest regions that are internationally connected and have better access to education. Conversely, human capital responses are negligible in regions lacking international connectivity, and even negative in better connected regions with inadequate educational opportunities. These results extend to internal migration, implying that highly vulnerable populations are trapped in the least developed areas.

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This article uses immigrant’s age of entry as a proxy for where they acquired their education. Data on age of entry are available from a subset of receiving countries that together represent 77 per cent of total skilled immigration to countries of the OECD. Using these data and a simple gravity model to estimate the age of entry structure of the remaining 23 per cent, alternative brain drain measures are proposed that exclude immigrants who arrived before ages 12, 18, and 22. Show less

Discussions of high-skilled mobility typically evoke migration patterns from poorer to wealthier countries, which ignore movements to and between developing countries. This paper presents, for the first time, a global overview of human capital mobility through bilateral migration stocks by gender and education in 1990 and 2000, and calculation of nuanced brain drain indicators. Building on newly collated data, the paper uses a novel estimation procedure based on a pseudo-gravity model, then identifies key determinants of international migration, and subsequently uses estimated parameters to impute missing data. Non-OECD destinations account for one-third of skilled migration, while OECD destinations are declining in relative importance.

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We investigate the relationship between remittances and migrants' education both theoretically and empirically, using original bilateral remittance data. At a theoretical level we lay out a model of remittances interacting migrants' human capital with two dimensions of immigration policy: restrictiveness, and selectivity. The model predicts that the relationship between remittances and migrants' education is ambiguous and depends on the immigration policy conducted at destination. The effect of education is more likely to be positive when the immigration policy is more restrictive and less skill-selective. These predictions are then tested empirically using bilateral remittance and migration data and proxy measures for the restrictiveness and selectivity of immigration policies at destination. The results strongly support the theoretical analysis, suggesting that immigration policies determine the sign and magnitude of the relationship between remittances and migrants' education.

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This article uses an original data set on international migration by educational attainment for 1990 and 2000 to analyze the determinants of brain drain from developing countries. The analysis shows that brain drain is strong in small countries that are close to major OECD regions, that share colonial links with OECD countries, and that send most of their migrants to countries with quality-selective immigration programs. Also concluded is that the brain drain increases with political instability and the degree of fractionalization at origin and decreases with natives’ human capital. Show less

Recent theoretical studies suggest that migration prospects can raise the expected return to human capital and thus foster education investment at home or, in other words, induce a brain gain. In a recent paper (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, Economic Journal, 2008) we used the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) data set on emigration rates by education level to examine the impact of brain drain migration on gross (pre-migration) human capital formation in developing countries. We found a positive effect of skilled migration prospects on human capital growth in a cross-section of 127 developing countries, with an elasticity of about five per cent. In this paper we assess the robustness of our results to the use of alternative brain drain measures, definitions of human capital, and functional forms. We find that the results hold using the Beine et al. (2007) alternative brain drain measures controlling for whether migrants acquired their skills in the home or in the host country. We also regress other indicators of human capital investment on skilled migration rates and find a positive effect on youth literacy while the effect on school enrolment depends on the exact specification chosen.

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This paper reviews four decades of economics research on the brain drain, with a focus on recent contributions and on development issues. We first assess the magnitude, intensity and determinants of the brain drain, showing that brain drain (or high-skill) migration is becoming the dominant pattern of international migration and a major aspect of globalization. We then use a stylized growth model to analyze the various channels through which a brain drain affects the sending countries and review the evidence on these channels. The recent empirical literature shows that high-skill emigration need not deplete a country's human capital stock and can generate positive network externalities. Three case studies are also considered: the African medical brain drain, the recent exodus of European scientists to the United States, and the role of the Indian diaspora in the development of India's IT sector. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of the analysis for education, immigration, and international taxation policies in a global context.

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